Evacuation lifts and what planning can actually secure

An evacuation lift is a core planning issue dressed as a technical one. It changes the size of the core, the floor plate efficiency and the unit mix, so the decision has to be made at design stage and shown on the drawings submitted for planning permission. By the time the Building Safety Regulator looks at the fire strategy, the core is fixed and the apartment layouts have been sold on that basis.

What planning can actually secure is narrower than many applicants assume. Planning can fix the space, the lobby, the core arrangement and the drawings. It cannot determine whether the lift performs as an evacuation lift, because that is building control and regulator territory.

Why evacuation lifts arise at planning stage

Three routes bring the question into a planning application.

Policy. The London Plan requires development proposals to provide at least one lift per core, or more, as a fire evacuation lift, within its inclusive design policy. Where that policy applies, the lift is a plan requirement rather than a design preference, and the submission has to show it.

The fire statement. For relevant buildings, Article 9A of the Development Management Procedure Order 2015 requires a fire statement with the application, with the Health and Safety Executive as statutory consultee at the first gateway. The statement asks about the evacuation strategy, and an evacuation strategy for a building with disabled occupants above the ground floor has to explain how those occupants leave.

Inclusive design. Even outside London, authorities with inclusive access policies ask how a wheelchair user on the eleventh floor evacuates. A fire statement or design statement that answers that question with a refuge and a promise of assistance invites a follow-up.

The space and core implications of providing one

This is the part that affects the development appraisal.

An evacuation lift needs a protected lobby at every storey it serves, large enough to hold waiting wheelchair users without blocking the escape route past them. That lobby is additional floor area in the core on every floor, and it is not saleable.

The lift itself needs a fire-rated shaft, protection against water ingress, a secondary power supply with its own protected route, and a communication system between the lobbies and the management point. The plant and switchgear take space, often at roof level or in a basement.

Then there is the strategy question. A single lift per core serving both normal and evacuation functions is the usual answer in residential buildings, but a building with a single lift has no redundancy during maintenance, which raises a management issue the authority may ask about.

Test the arrangement early with a core study. On a slab block with two cores and eight units per floor, adding a lobby of any size to each core can remove a unit per floor, and that result is better known at concept stage than at technical design.

Where policy requires inclusive evacuation

Be precise about what applies to your site, because the position differs by authority and has moved.

In London, the inclusive design policy of the London Plan is the operative requirement, and borough local plans add their own expectations. Outside London, requirements derive from local plan inclusive design or accessible housing policies, which vary widely in how specific they are.

Nationally, the government has consulted on requiring evacuation lifts in new residential buildings above a given height, and the treatment of evacuation lifts in Approved Document B has been under review. As at October 2026, check the current edition of the Approved Document and any published government response rather than assuming a national requirement is in force. Guidance in the relevant British Standard for residential fire safety design covers evacuation lifts and refuges and is the document designers work to in practice.

The related question of personal evacuation planning for residents who cannot self-evacuate has also been the subject of consultation and policy development. That is a management duty on the responsible person rather than a planning matter, but it affects the strategy the fire statement describes.

Interaction with the fire statement

The fire statement is where the evacuation approach is set out for the planning authority and the statutory consultee. It must be prepared by someone with the necessary fire engineering competence, since it is legally required for the buildings it applies to, and an AI-assisted draft is a starting point for that professional rather than a substitute.

Three things the statement should align with the drawings on. The evacuation strategy, whether simultaneous, phased or stay put, and what that implies for lift use. The location and size of refuges and lobbies, matching the submitted plans rather than describing a generic arrangement. And the position of the fire main, the firefighting lift where one is required, and the relationship between firefighting and evacuation provision, since these are different lifts with different purposes and are sometimes confused in submissions.

For buildings close to but below the threshold, the question of how much fire evidence to provide is its own problem, covered in fire evidence for a building just below the threshold. A fuller fire safety strategy to the relevant British Standard is a fire engineering document and needs the same professional authorship.

What a condition can and cannot secure

Planning conditions must meet the six tests in national guidance: necessary, relevant to planning, relevant to the development, enforceable, precise and reasonable. That shapes what is achievable.

Conditions that work:

• Development to be carried out in accordance with the approved drawings, which fixes the core and lobby arrangement.
• A requirement for details of the core layout at a larger scale to be approved before construction above ground level.
• Securing the provision of a lift serving all storeys, where the policy basis exists.
• Requiring an inclusive access management plan where the authority's policy supports it.

Conditions that do not work well. A condition requiring the lift to comply with the Building Regulations duplicates a separate statutory regime and fails the necessity test. A condition requiring the building to be safe is imprecise and unenforceable. And a condition attempting to specify fire engineering performance invites a dispute between two regulators, which helps nobody.

Where the obligation is management rather than physical, a planning obligation is sometimes used instead, though authorities differ on whether evacuation management falls within the proper scope of one.

Building control and regulator approval afterwards

Planning permission is the first of several hurdles. For higher-risk buildings the gateway regime under the Building Safety Act 2022 framework applies, with the Building Safety Regulator approving the design before construction and the completed building before occupation.

That sequencing has two consequences for the design team. A lift arrangement that satisfies the planning authority can still be rejected later on technical grounds, so the planning drawings should be developed with fire engineering input rather than coordinated afterwards. And changes required at gateway stage can take the building outside the approved planning drawings, which means a non-material amendment or a fresh application.

Design the core once, with the fire engineer in the room. It is cheaper than designing it twice.

Evidence to submit

For a scheme where evacuation lifts are in play, the planning submission should carry:

1. Core plans at a scale showing the lift, the lobby, refuge space and the escape route past it.
2. A schedule confirming which storeys the lift serves and the basis of the strategy.
3. A fire statement prepared by a competent fire engineer, consistent with the drawings.
4. A statement of policy compliance against the relevant inclusive design and fire policies.
5. A design and access statement section on inclusive access that addresses evacuation rather than only entry.
6. Where basements form part of the scheme, egress from below ground, which raises the distinct issues in safe egress from habitable basement rooms.

The common failure is a submission describing an evacuation strategy that the drawings cannot deliver. Officers and consultees read both, and the inconsistency is the first thing a reviewer finds.

For specialist technical reports, qualified professional input may be required. This is general guidance, not legal advice, so check the current Approved Document, policy position and your local planning authority's requirements before relying on it. PlanScope provides AI-assisted draft reports for planning applications. Reports should be reviewed before submission. We do not guarantee planning approval.